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Perhaps a central theme of debates over the Scottish economy has 
been the notion of the 'branch plant economy'. Ever since the 1960s 
commentators have pointed to th~ drift in ownership and control away 
from Scotland and towards England and America. Scottish manufacturing 
industry has increasingly become subject to decisions mad~ outside 
of Scotland's borders, and it is therefore difficult to sustain any 
idea of distinctive and autonomously Scottish patterns of economic 
development. This trend towards declining autonomy is not a recent 
phenomenon but reaches back to the early days of Scottish industria~ 
isation. What is significant about the post-war period is the rapid-
ity with which autonomy has d~clined. This decline has continued 
apace in recent years and, most worryingly to many commentators,has 
begun to have consequences at the financial heart of the Scottish 
economy. 
The Development of the Scottish Economy 
Continuing into the 1960s the Scottish economy showed the legacy 
inherited from its early pattern of industrial development. As a 
junior partner to English industri.alisation,Scotland evolved an ec-
onomy focused around textiles and heavy industry. The competitive 
challenges of the late nineteenth century created particularly great 
problems for the producers of basic and standardised goods such as 
jute, cotton, and iron, though the relatively more specialised pro-
ducers of steel and ships were able to maintain their prosperity 
through strategies of market differentiation. By the 1920s, however, 
these specialised producers found their overseas markets rapidly 
disappearing, and their difficulties exacerbated the problems faced 
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by the producers of basic goods. (l) By this time the major business 
enterprises had become locked together into a system of 'big business• 
which gave birth to a group of established business dynasties and 
prominent capitalists who dominated the Scottish economy. ( 2 ) Sitting 
on the boards of the major banks, investment trusts, and industrial 
companies such men as Lithgow, Bilsland, and Weir were the key fig-
ures in various attempts to restructure Scottish heavy industry in 
the inter-war years. 
These attempts had limited success, and they failed to come to 
grips with the wider issue of altering the dependence of Scottish 
economic activity on a declining base of heavy industry. Such change 
as occurred in the post-war period was essentially piecemeal and was 
associated with a continuing transfer of ownership and control to 
England. Under regional development policies aimed at improving the 
economy's employment and earnings record, Scotland received over 30 
per cent of all central government regional aid in the period from 
1960 to 1972. Although this did little to improve the situation, it 
perhaps prevented matters from getting any worse. Heavy industry con-
tinued to decline, and this structured the whole development of the 
Scottish economy over this period. From the late 1960s some improve-
ment in employment prospects took place as multinational enterprises 
moved into Scotland and began to diversify the industrial base. This 
improvement, however, had its price: 59 per cent of manufacturing 
employment in 1973 was in plants owned from outside Scotland. This 
drift towards a branch plant economy meant that the largest plants 
and the fastest growing industries (electronics, chemicals, vehicles) 
were dominated by non-Scottish firms. More and more of the key de-
cisions concerning Scotland's industry were being made outside of 
Scotland. ( 3 ) 
By the mid-1970s this relative improvement in the Scottish ec-
onomy had hastened in pace as a result of the oil and gas discover-
ies in the North Sea. The oil industry required a massive inflow of 
capital and it stimulated domestic financial institutions, but doubts 
were expressed as to whether the industry would have sufficient long-
term impact to help resolve the problems of the Clydeside region. 
Interlinked with this was an extensive public debate over the econo-
mic viability of a politically independent Scotland. The SNP slogan 
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'It's Scotland's Oil' expressed both the optimism and the pessimism 
of the period: optimism that control over the oil resources would 
create a viable Scottish economy, and pessimism that this potential 
would be frittered away by the Westminster government. 
By the late 1970s much of the economic and political optimism 
had evaporated. It had come to be realised that oil alone could not 
correct the structural imbalances of the Scottish economy. And the 
depression in the British economy and world trade from 1976 meant 
that there was less scope for outside firms to continue investing. 
Even the widely-acclaimed investment activities of the Scottish Dev-
elopment Authority failed to prevent a series of closures and job 
losses in West and Central Scotland. The impact of oil in Edinburgh, 
Tayside, and the North East, and the continuing decline of heavy in-
dustry exacerbated the long-standing split between East and West in 
Scotland, though some commentators were expressing the view that the 
decline of heavy industry made Scotland accord with the 'slimmer-but-
fitter' ideal of the Conservative government. 'De-industrialisation' 
- a reduced significance for heavy industry and a thriving financial 
services sector - meant that Scotland might be well placed to come 
out of the recession more rapidly than the rest of Britain. Such a 
prognosis, of course, presumed that the recession would soon be over, 
and that Scotland would have the economic autonomy to take advantage 
of this. On the available evidence such prospects seem bleak. Even if 
the depression should end sooner rather than later, there are import-
ant underlying trends which are destroying the capacity to evolve an 
autonomous response. These trends can be documented in the three key 
economic sectors of manufacturing, oil and finance. 
Manufacturing Industry 
As has been shown above, the manufacturing sector has been the 
focus of the shift towards a branch plant economy. The major heavy 
industries of Scotland were nationalised after the second world war 
and by the Labour governments of the 1960s and 1970s. Coal was nat-
ionalised in 1946, steel in 1965, and shipbuilding in 1978. Control 
in each of these concerns has been removed from the major interests 
in the Scottish economy, and decisions over the closure of pits, 
works, and yards are taken without explicit consideration of their 
implications for the Scottish economy. British Steel's complex re-
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organisation plans have important implications for its Scottish opera-
tions, and these problems have been exacerbated by the fact that the 
decline of Scottish heavy industry has led to Scottish steel being 
exported to the South: the Scottish works are now more vulnerable 
to closure because of the extra expense of transporting their pro-
ducts to where they are needed. British Shipbuilders continues to 
face a problem of lack of orders in the face of competition from 
Japan. The Corporation has also been beset by uncertainties over 
proposals to 'privatise 1 parts of its operations. The Conservative 
government introduced plans to denationalise the naval yards (which 
include the former Yarrow yard) but withdrew these plans twice, only 
to reintroduce them at a time when its own defence expenditure review 
had made the naval yards a less appealing prospect for private inves~ 
ors. 
Other major sectors of Scottish industry have experienced English 
and foreign takeovers in recent years. In food and drink production 
two major companies have been taken-over and one narrowly escaped: 
Robertson Foods was taken over by Avana, and Belhaven Brewery (form-
erly CCH Investments) was acquired by Eric 'Miss World' Morley in 
1980. Although Highland Distilleries was threatened with a takeover 
bid from Hiram Walker of Canada, this was blocked by the government 
following a negative Monopolies Commission report. Anderson Strath-
clyde, the mining equipment manufacturer, had 28 per cent of its 
shares acquired by Charter Consolidated in 1980. Charter is the Lon-
don end of Harry Openheimer 1 s South African gold and diamond business 
and claimed to be buying Anderson's shares simply in order to pre-
vent another group from taking control. In 1982, however, Charter 
launched a full-scale bid of its own and the fate of Anderson Strath-
clyde now depends upon a report from the Monopolies Commission. In 
textiles, Lindustries has been acquired by tlanson Trust, and in re-
tail distribution House of Fraser continues its struggle with Lonrho. 
Outside ownership does not only have implications for decision-
making and control, but also has important consequences for job 
losses and plant closures. The Linwood car plant, for example, had 
been set up by the English Rootes Group, which was later t.aken over 
by the American Chrysler Corporation. Following problems at its 
parent company the European interests of Chrysler were taken-over by 
the Peugeot-Citroen Group, which has renamed the group Talbot 
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and has closed the Linwood plant. Job losses on a large-scale have 
also occurred with the closure of the Singer plant and with cut-backs 
by BL at Bathgate. 
The recent problems at the Weir Group raised the spectre of 
massive job losses in its pump and desalination plants. Weir's pro-
blems began in 1979, and the following year saw extensive management 
changes and the loss of 3,000 jobs. Because the difficulties contin-
ued the company's bankers (primarily the Royal Bank and the Finance 
Corporation for Industry) consulted the SDA and initiated a major 
reconstruction. Perhaps the most visible sign of change was that 
Lord Weir was replaced as chairman by Sir Francis Tombs, formerly 
the chairman of the Electricity Council and currently a director of 
the Rothschild merchant bank. The Weir family shareholdings were al-
so reduced in order to release capital for the family to take up 
their rights in the new convertible preference shares which were 
issued to replace the loan capital. Although this could be seen as 
a sign of faith by the family in the future of the company, it is 
unclear what proportion of the shares they will hold after the new 
shares are converted into voting ordinary shares. A further complica-
tion was that a majority of the new convertible shares were taken up 
by Jacob Rothschild's RIT and its associates. This deal would even-
tually give RIT 36 per cent of the votes in the company. Rothschild's 
view of Weir as a 'recovery situation1 has been borne out by recent 
events at Weir, and it is perhaps likely that RIT will seek to be-
come actively involved in the running of the company. 
The manufacturing base of the Scottish economy has experienced 
a continual erosion of Scottish control. As the industrial base has 
moved away from heavy industry to a more diversified structure, so 
outside ownership and control has become of greater significance. It 
is for this reason that so much faith was pinned on oil: if oil de-
velopments could be shaped by the thriving financial sector, then 
some of the worst features of the branch plant economy might be avoi~ 
ed. 
North Sea Oil 
Until the 1970s, 'Scottish Oil' meant Burmah Oil. Although dom-
estic oil production began in the nineteenth century with the comm-
ercial exploitation of shale oil, the main area of involvement of 
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Scottish capital in the oil industry was investment in Burmah's far 
and middle eastern operations. Apart from this and the shale oil 
(eventually taken over by BP) there was only a small company, Prem-
ier Consolidated, operating in the Trinidad oilfields. The recent 
explorations in the North Sea began in 1964 and the first Scottish 
oil was discovered in 1969, although oil did not actually begin to 
flow into Scotland on a commercial scale until 1975. Much emphasis 
was placed upon the impact which it was hoped the oil industry would 
have on Scottish employment. The main areas of employment associated 
with oil were in the exploration and development of fields, in rig 
and platform construction, in supply and service, and in associated 
engineering works such as those shipbuilders which might be able to 
produce supply vessels or to convert to rig and platform building. 
Not the least important aspect of this impact was the disruption it 
brought or threatened to the Scottish countryside. The planned and 
built construction yards and refineries have generated a massive mo-
bilisation of environmental groups and have led to major public in-
quiries. This has made the names of many such areas into household 
words: Nigg Bay, Dunnett Bay, Portavadie, Ardyne Point, Moss Moran, 
and Drumbuie. The main employment impact has been in the North East, 
though much hope has been held out for the economic development of 
Tayside. The main impact on the West of Scotland has perhaps been 
that those who have migrated from here in search of work have been 
more likely to travel to other parts of Scotland than they were to 
follow the time-worn path to the South. But the oil industry has not 
been a simple success story. Oil cannot be isolated from wider trends 
in the world economy, and overcapacity in rig and platform produc-
tion has created many redundancies. 
Initially it was expected that Burmah Oil would play a leading 
role in the development of Scottish oil, but these expectations were 
rudely shattered by the collapse of Burmah in 1974. Until the 1960s, 
Burmah had been largely dependent upon its shareholdings in BP and 
Shell, but in 1962 it began to build up its own production base and 
to diversify its activities. Successful bids for Castrol, Rawlplug, 
Halfords, and other companies led it into chemicals, industrial pro-
ducts, car components and engineering. In 1973 it took the major step
of taking-over the American Signal Oil and Gas Company. Major losses 
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in its tanker division, however, led to the need for a complete fin-
ancial and managerial reorganisation in 1974 and 1975. As part of the 
government-sponsored rescue operation the Signal interests had to be 
sold, and most of Burmah's North Sea interests were transferred to 
the newly formed British National Oil Corporation. It was not until 
1981 that Burmah could truly be regarded as a healthy company once 
more, as it began to move back into the North Sea and launched an un-
successful take-over bid for the large chemicals group of Croda. 
The difficulties of Burmah led to a declining role for Scottish 
interests in running the Company (the Head Office had already been 
moved from Glasgow to Swindon), but its enforced withdrawal from the 
North Sea perhaps opened-up new possibilities for the smaller Scott-
ish oil companies which had already begun to spring up. A number of 
these companies were simply exploration syndicates formed by invest-
ment groups, mirroring the origins of Burmah itself, but some aimed 
from the beginning at becoming fully integrated oil companies. Per-
haps the most successful of these companies has been London and 
Scottish Marine Oil, formed by the London stockbrokers Cazenove with 
a syndicate of Scottish investment interests holding 37 per cent of 
the capital. LSMO rapidly became a major force in Scottish oil: in 
1976 it took over Bates Oil Corporation (formerly run by Ivory and 
Sime), in 1977 it acquired its sister company Scottish Canadian Oil 
and Transport, and in 1977 it acquired Oil Exploration. LSMO has its 
main production interests in the Ninian oil field and the Hewett gas 
field, but it has numerous participations in exploration groups. The 
company has always been based in London and although Ivory and Sime 
continue to be associated with the firm it has lost much of whatever 
Scottish character it originally had. 
The Ivory and Sime group, together with Noble Grossart, were 
also associated with a number of exploration investment companies. 
Through its banking company Ivory and Sime formed Caledonian Off-
shore and Viking Oil a large proportion of their shares being taken 
by Ivory and Sime and other Scottish investment groups. Noble Gross-
art formed Pict Petroleum and Caber Oil, selling many of the shares 
to Scottish investors. Although Viking was acquired by the American 
Sun Oil group in 1980, most of these companies retain close links to 
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however, been essentially a passive investment role. Nor have their 
successes been particularly significant: Pict, for example, contin-
ues its long association with the French Elf and Total groups, but 
has not so far made a big oil strike. 
This exclusion or withdrawal of Scottish investment inter-
ests from active involvement in oil production is brought out also 
in the histories of the two remaining 'Scottish' oil companies. Pre-
mier Consolidated, which has had little success in the North Sea, 
has long been owned and controlled from London; and this was re-
inforced when it merged with the Ball and Collins group in 1977. 
Premier has little or no Scottish character left to it. Clyde Petro-
leum was set up by London merchant bankers Singer and Friedlander, 
but the majority of its shares were sold to Glasgow investment in-
terests when it was formed. Clyde remains an important force in Sco-
ttish oil and moved onto oil production in 1981, so adopting a much 
more integrated form. Whereas LSMO moved from production to explora-
tion (via the acquisition of Oil Exploration), Clyde has followed 
the opposite pattern. 
Such changes as have occurred in Scottish control over oil ex-
ploration and production companies are overshadowed by the implica-
tions of the establishment of the British National Oil Corporation. 
BNOC was set up in 1975 as a Glasgow-based government agency which 
was to take participations in exploration and production consorti-
ums and was to market oil produced in the UK sector through its 
right to buy up to 51 per cent of all crude oil produced in the sec-
tor. The BNOC took over the oil interests of the Coal Board and was 
soon involved in the Burmah rescue plan, taking over Burmah's North 
Sea holdings. Although having its headquarters in Glasgow, the main 
board of BNOC has not been recruited from within Scotland. After an 
internal row Lord Kearton was succeeded as Chairman and Chief Exec-
utive by Philip Shelbourne, formerly of the Midland Bank's merchant 
banking division. Another director followed Shelbourne from the Mid-
land group, and N.M. Rothschild, where Shelbourne had previously 
worked, were appointed as advisers to BNOC. The Conservative gov-
ernment has proposed a partial 'privatisation' of its operations. 
Initially privatisation was envisaged as involving the sale of shares
in the Corporation itself, but this plan has subsequently been modi-
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fied. The trades unions representatives on the BNOC board are oppos-
ed to privatisation, and the Labour Party has pledged itself to re-
nationalisation if it is ever returned to power. Shelbourne himself 
is in favour of privatisation, but not necessarily in the form curr-
ently envisaged by the government. The plan involves a separation of 
the Corporation's trading and exploration activities, with the non-
trading operations being formed into a new subsidiary (Britoil) which 
would have 51 per cent of its shares sold through the stock exchange. 
BNOC itself would retain its crude oil marketing operations - it curr-
ently handles 60 per cent of all oil produced in British waters. 
BNOC, therefore, is not part of the established Scottish business 
system, the Edinburgh and Glasgow investment interests having little 
influence over its affairs. It is unlikely that privatisation would 
make any difference in this respect. 
The Financial Sector 
A key role in maintaining a distinctively Scottish economy has 
been played by the companies of the financial sector. In particular, 
the three clearing banks have acted as foci for the coordination of 
the affairs of Scotland's major companies. This is not to say that 
they have consciously and deliberately planned an autonomous 'Sco-
ttish' strategy of economic development - far from it. The banks have 
recruited their directors from the major industrial and investment 
interests in Scotland and have, in turn, constituted a virtual 
'clearing house' for non-executive directors. The banks function as 
forums in which business information can be accumulated and a broad 
perspective on Scottish affairs can be taken; the interlocking di-
rectorships focused around the banks enable this information and 
perspective to be disseminated throughout the economy. As a result, 
it has always made sense to talk about 'Scottish' companies and a 
•Scottish' economy. 
Each bank has, however, its own distinctive features. The 
Clydesdale - the smallest of the three - maintains most of its links 
with the Glasgow and Aberdeen regions apd operates very much within 
the framework of its London parent, the Midland Bank. It has become 
involved in oil mainly through the on-shore support businesses, but 
it has not attempted to move overseas, or even into England. By con-
















up a specialised oil division, helped to form the International En-
ergy Bank, has taken shareholdings in oil-related businesses and has 
expanded the scope of its banking operations. In particular it has 
been expanding its number of branches in England, and has been seek-
ing an entry into American retail banking. 
The Royal Bank of Scotland is Scotland's biggest bank with just 
over a half of the nation's banking business. It has not only become 
heavily involved in oil but has expanded overseas, especially in 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Indonesia. It was towards the end of 1980 
that events at the Royal Bank threw the whole Scottish financial 
system into a panic. Lloyds Bank, which owns 16 per cent of the Royal 
intimated an interest in acquiring the balance of the Royal Bank cap~
tal. The directors of the Royal rejected this as a threat to the 
Bank's identity and began to look for a merger partner that would 
prevent a Lloyd's take-over and maintain the Royal's autonomy. It 
found this partner in the Standard and Chartered Bank, whose search 
for a British base complemented the Royal Bank's search for overseas 
operations. In the midst of these negotiations, however, a counter-
bid carne from the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. This bid was rejected 
by the Royal's directors- rather paradoxically in view of the long 
and close relationship which had existed between the Royal Bank and 
Jardine Matheson, a close associate of the Hong Kong Bank. There are 
already plans to integrate the Royal Bank branch network fully with 
the English network of its Williams and Glyns subsidiary, and many 
people in the Scottish business community felt that the merger with 
the Standard and Chartered Bank would shift the group's centre of 
gravity even further to the south. The great panic which was felt 
about the bids reflected a wider concern over the declining autonomy 
of the Scottish economy. It was recognised that Scotland had drifted 
towards being simply a branch plant economy, and the possible loss 
of the Royal Bank was seen as a further, and irrevocable, step in 
this direction. The loss of the Royal Bank, it was felt, would have 
struck at the heart of the Edinburgh financial system, which had at 
least retained a certain autonomy in the face of the drift towards 
the branch plant economy. In the event, the Monopolies Commission 
agreed with this viewpoint and the proposed mergers were refused. 
Uncertainty remains, however, about how long the Royal Bank can re-
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tajn jts autonomy. 
Merchant banking and the investment trust movement have always 
been closely linked in Scotland, and the major investment groups are 
at the heart of the financial establishment. Scotland has tradition-
ally been the main focus of investment management in Britain, and 
there are currently about a dozen very active groups operating main-
ly from Edinburgh and Glasgow. A major trend since the 1960s has 
been for trusts to be more closely coordinated into particular invest-
ment groups, and all the main groups are now tending to convert their 
trusts into more specialised investment vehicles. Pension funds and 
insurance companies, which have grown massively in importance during 
the 1970s, increasingly want to carry out their own general invest-
ment, and therefore prefer to avoid investing in the old-style gen-
eral investment trust. As a result, trusts are increasingly specia-
lising in Japan, the USA, energy, high technology, and so forth in 
order to meet those specialist investment needs which the big insti-
tutions cannot meet through their own 'in-house' operations. Those 
trusts which do not follow this path tend to become prime candidates 
for take-overs or unitisation. For example, Edinburgh Fund Managers, 
Murray Johnstone and Baillie Gifford have all begun to follow the 
path of specialisation, whilst Stewart Fund Managers have partly un-
itized their Scottish European Investment Trust. The Edinburgh Inves~ 
rnent Trust hopes to avoid this by expanding its role as an actively 
managed general trust which would meet the needs of non-institutional 
investers and smaller institutions. In the sphere of take-overs, 
British investment was acquired by the National Coal Board pension 
fund, and Edinburgh and Dundee by British Rail pensions. In both 
these cases the pension schemes were seeking access to general in-
vestment portfolios as a rapid way of building-up their own in-
house expertise. 
Perhaps the most significant investment trust takeovers have 
been those brought about by the RIT group. Following a long family 
dispute, Jacob Rothschild split-off from the main Rothschild family 
banking business and used Rothschild Investment Trust (now RIT) as 
the vehicle for building up a substantial financial group. With 
backing from the American Saul Steinberg's Reliance Group, RIT 
expanded into merchant banking, insurance, investment, and unit 
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trusts. Apart from its move into the Weir Group, discussed above, 
RIT has become involved with two Scottish investment trsuts. In 1981 
it completely reorganised Ailsa Investment Trust, putting in David 
Montagu as the new chairman. The following year RIT made its biggest 
ever deal when Jacob Rothschild engineered a reverse take-over of 
the Great Northern Investment Trust of Glasgow: Great Northern, one 
of Britain's largest trusts, nominally acquired RIT, but effectively 
Rothschild acquired control of a much larger group. The trust has 
changed its name to RIT and Northern under the joint chairmanship of 
Jacob Rothschild and Lord Weir, but few can doubt that the name and 
the chair will soon reflect Rothschild dominance. 
Undoubtedly the most active investment group in recent years 
has been Ivory and Sime, Scotland's largest such group. Following 
problems with some of its large investments (Edward Bates, Welfare 
Insurance, and HawPar) it has begun to restructure some of its ac-
tivities. Each of its trusts follows a specific investment policy 
and it has built up its list of private and pension clients. Ivory 
and Sime has always been an active investment group and Atlantic 
Assets has been used more as a holding company than an investment 
trust. It has cross-shareholdings with other trusts in the group as 
well as stakes in associated companies. Until 1981 Atlantic held 
25 per cent of the Save and Prosper Unit Trust group. This holding 
was sold to the Robert Fleming merchant bank in London. Much of 
Ivory and Sime 1 s involvement in oil has been in association with the 
merchant bankers Noble Grossart. 
Until the end of the 1960's merchant banking hardly existed, 
but the sector experienced a massive growth following the oil and 
gas discoveries. Morgan Grenfell, Slater Walker, Hill Samuel, and 
various foreign banks all set up offices in Scotland, and from with-
in Scotland the Finlay group and the Bank of Scotland branched out 
into merchant banking. Noble Grossart represented a totally new and 
totally Scottish development in merchant banking, being originally 
backed by Angus Grossart, Sir Hugh Fraser, and the Stenhouse group. 
In close partnership with Ivory and Sime, Noble Grossart has formed 
a number of oil and oil investment companies and has recently been 
expanding into the Middle East. Despite a few problems in 1980 when 
the institutional shareholders in its oil investment company North 
Sea Assets imposed a moratorium on new investments, the group has 
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continued tn prosper and a successful flotation of North Sea Assets 
was made in 1981. 
Today, merchant banking in Scotland is dominated by Noble Gross-
art and the British Linen Bank. Although merchant banking has re-
tained a great deal of autonomy within Scotland it cannot be seen as 
immune to the trend towards outside ownership and control. The Brit-
ish Linen Bank is a subsidiary of the Bank of Scotland, and there is 
the ever-present possibility that Barclays will increase its hold 
over the Bank. The relative lack of success of the Royal Bank in 
merchant banking has fuelled rumours that it intends to make a bid 
for Noble Grossart; such a merger would make the Royal Bank an even 
more attractive target for a take-over bid. 
Conclusion: Prospects for the Future 
Scotland's economy is losing its distinctiveness. The old heavy 
industries no longer predominate as the industrial structure becomes 
more diversified. The associated changes in ownership and control 
have led to declining autonomy as the Scottish economy becomes more 
closely integrated into the British and wider world economy. Scot-
land is becoming simply a 'region'. But Scottish finance has not 
become so closely tied to the British economy and remains relatively 
prosperous. The problem of the financial sector is that it has pros-
pered in association with the internationalisation of the Scottish 
economy. Paradoxically, the branch plant manufacturing economy has 
bolstered the autonomous Scottish financial system. This is particu-
larly clear in oil, where merchant banking and investment management 
have grown in response to the needs of the incoming businesses. The 
very prosperity of Scottish finance reflects the external orienta-
tion of the economy. Although the Scottish clearing banks have al-
ways maintained close links to Scottish manufacturing industry, the 
decline of the latter has forced them to concentrate more of their 
attention on the wider British economy and to become more concerned 
to enter into close relations with the externally-orientated merchant 
banking sector. The autonomy of the Scottish economy has always been 
allied to the prominent role played by Scotland's distinctive banking 
system. If the banking system becomes subject to a greater degree of 
outside ownership and control, this may have even more far-reaching 
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